The scientist Brown & Williamson had paid more than $300,000 a year to lead its research was teaching high school science in Louisville, Kentucky, for $30,000 a year when he told a television audience what he had learned inside the company.
Jeffrey Wigand joined Brown & Williamson, the Louisville tobacco company owned by British American Tobacco, on January 1, 1989, as its vice president for research and development. He held a doctorate in biochemistry from the University at Buffalo and had spent nearly twenty years in the health care and biotechnology industries, including jobs at Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson and Union Carbide. Then a tobacco firm hired him with a brief to reduce the hazards in its cigarettes.
Four years later he was out of a job and bound by a confidentiality agreement that his family’s health coverage depended on. In 1995 he broke that agreement, first as an unnamed source and then in a sworn deposition for the State of Mississippi. The state was suing the industry to recover the public cost of treating sick smokers. When CBS finally broadcast his interview on 60 Minutes on February 4, 1996, Wigand was the star witness in a U.S. Justice Department criminal investigation into the tobacco industry.
Ammonia, Coumarin and the Shelved Safer Cigarette
Wigand arrived believing the company wanted a cigarette less likely to cause cancer, heart disease and emphysema. He began by asking whether it had ever studied nicotine’s pharmacology or its effect on the central nervous system. He was told, as a rule, that the company did no such work, although thousands of pages from the confidential files of Brown & Williamson and British American Tobacco later showed that it had. His first doubts came after a meeting of research heads from British American Tobacco companies around the world, where the scientists discussed jointly developing a less hazardous product. The minutes ran to roughly eighteen pages, and Wigand said a company staff attorney, Kendrick Wells, rewrote them to remove the discussion of a safer cigarette. Any admission that one product was safer implied that the rest were unsafe.
When Wigand complained to Thomas Sandefur, then the company’s president, Sandefur told him, in Wigand’s recollection, “I don’t want to hear any more discussion about a safer cigarette.” Sandefur’s lawyers later called this and other accounts of their conversations absolutely false. Wigand then turned to the chemistry of the company’s existing products.
The first of those issues involved ammonia, since Brown & Williamson treated its tobacco with ammonia compounds. The process was described in an internal leaf blenders’ handbook titled Root Technology and known in the industry as “impact boosting.” Wigand said the chemistry allowed nicotine to be absorbed more rapidly in the lung and so to reach the brain and central nervous system faster. He said this let the company manipulate the nicotine a smoker received without adding any extra nicotine to the leaf. He also pointed to glycerol, a common additive used to keep tobacco moist, which forms a lung irritant called acrolein when it burns.
The issue that ended his career was coumarin, a sweet flavoring that causes liver tumors in mice. The company had removed it from its cigarettes but kept it in Sir Walter Raleigh aromatic pipe tobacco until at least 1992, after trying and failing to find a substitute with the same taste. When a federal toxicology program published studies presenting coumarin as a carcinogen, Wigand wrote to Sandefur that he could not in conscience keep it in a product. He was told that it would stay because removing it would affect sales.
Fired, Sued and Threatened in Louisville
Sandefur became chief executive in 1993, and on March 24 of that year he had Wigand fired, citing poor communication skills and poor performance. Brown & Williamson’s own personnel records showed good appraisals for his first three years. A reference letter issued after his dismissal on company stationery credited him with a significant upgrade in the firm’s research capabilities. His severance included pay and health benefits for his wife and two young daughters, one of whom needed expensive daily medical care.
In September 1993 the company sued him, saying he had broken his confidentiality agreement by discussing his severance package, and it suspended both the payments and the health coverage while the case was pending. Wigand settled in November by signing a stricter, lifelong nondisclosure agreement, after which the benefits were restored. His wife Lucretia later said on camera that the strain brought the couple close to separating.
On April 14, 1994, seven tobacco chief executives testified under oath before the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, chaired by Henry Waxman, in a hearing that lasted seven hours. Each of them said he did not believe nicotine was addictive, and Sandefur, representing Brown & Williamson, told the subcommittee, “I believe that nicotine is not addictive.” Wigand, who had watched the testimony closely, later said he believed Sandefur had perjured himself, because inside the company people described their business as nicotine delivery.
Congressional and Food and Drug Administration investigators contacted Wigand that spring, and after notifying Brown & Williamson he spoke with them. In April 1994 he received two anonymous telephone threats against his children, the second on April 28, when a male caller told him, “Leave tobacco alone or else you’ll find your kids hurt.” After those calls he began carrying a handgun.
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How CBS Shelved the Interview and the Journal Freed It
Wigand met Lowell Bergman, a 60 Minutes producer, in February 1994, when Bergman was preparing a story on Philip Morris. Bergman hired him as a consultant, for about $12,000, to analyze nearly a thousand pages of technical documents. At the time Wigand refused to discuss his former employer. He did not do so until more than a year later, agreeing on August 3, 1995, to an on-camera interview with Mike Wallace. Two days earlier Westinghouse had announced a $5.4 billion deal to buy CBS. On October 2 the network’s general counsel, Ellen Kaden, blocked the interview on the grounds that CBS could be sued for “tortious interference” with Wigand’s confidentiality contract.
On November 12, 1995, 60 Minutes aired a cut version of the story in which Wigand was neither shown nor named, and Wallace added a critical footnote about the decision. Wigand had already guided a Wall Street Journal story on the company’s use of ammonia compounds in October, and on November 29 he gave his deposition in the Mississippi case. On January 26, 1996, the Wall Street Journal published that deposition, which removed the network’s reason for holding back, and the full interview aired nine days later.
By then Brown & Williamson had obtained a Kentucky court order against him and had investigators searching his past. Its lawyers compiled a 500-page dossier accusing him of offenses ranging from shoplifting to a false $95.20 dry-cleaning claim, and a public relations consultant, John Scanlon, circulated it to reporters. The Wall Street Journal examined the file and reported on its front page that many of its serious allegations were backed by “scanty or contradictory evidence.” It found that some, including the claim that he had pleaded guilty to shoplifting, were “demonstrably untrue.” In the same weeks his wife filed for divorce, and he told Wallace that there were times he wished he had not come forward.
Other Insiders, a Settlement and a Hollywood Film
Wigand was one of several people who exposed the industry in the mid-1990s. Victor DeNoble was a Philip Morris researcher who had studied nicotine addiction in rats until the company closed his laboratory and fired him in 1984. He testified to the Waxman subcommittee in April 1994 after Congress released him from his own secrecy agreement. Merrell Williams, a paralegal at the Louisville law firm Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, copied about 4,000 pages of Brown & Williamson documents between 1988 and 1992. In May 1994 a set of them reached Stanton Glantz, a professor at the University of California, San Francisco, in a box sent anonymously from “Mr. Butts.” Among them was a July 17, 1963, memo in which the company’s general counsel, Addison Yeaman, wrote that the company was in the business of selling nicotine, an addictive drug.
Mississippi settled with the industry in July 1997, followed by Florida, Texas and Minnesota. On November 23, 1998, Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, Brown & Williamson and Lorillard signed the Master Settlement Agreement with 46 states, committing about $206 billion over its first 25 years. With the four earlier deals, that brought the total to about $246 billion. The agreement banned outdoor billboard advertising, dissolved the Tobacco Institute, opened industry documents to the public and funded the anti-smoking group now called the Truth Initiative. Its annual payments to the states continue with no end date.
Michael Mann’s film The Insider, released on November 5, 1999, cast Russell Crowe as Wigand and Al Pacino as Bergman. It drew on Marie Brenner’s May 1996 Vanity Fair article about Wigand, “The Man Who Knew Too Much.” It received seven Academy Award nominations, including Best Picture and Best Actor for Crowe, and won none. The film opens with a notice that certain elements were fictionalized for dramatic effect. Mike Wallace, played by Christopher Plummer, objected that it made him look slower to protest the network’s decision than he had been.
Wigand went on to lecture and act as a consultant on tobacco control to governments including Canada, Japan, France and Germany, and he founded a nonprofit called Smoke-Free Kids. In 1996, the year his interview finally aired, he was named Kentucky’s Teacher of the Year for his work at duPont Manual High School. It was a public school in the same city as the Brown & Williamson headquarters that had fired him.




